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SIEGEL v. CHICKEN DELIGHT, INC.:
WHAT'S IN A NAME?
In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently affirmed a district court finding that the fran-
chise agreements of Chicken Delight which had required franchisees
to purchase certain items exclusively from Chicken Delight constituted
an illegal "tie-in" arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act anti-
trust provisions.' The decision will have significant ramifications in the
franchise industry-a major force in the American economy.
The purchase restrictions contained in Chicken Delight franchise
agreements could arguably have been reviewed for possible antitrust
violations under either of two differing bodies of antitrust law: that
relating to tying arrangements, or that relating to exclusive dealing
and requirements contracts. While .both the tying and exclusive deal-
ing doctrines have as their goals the freedom of economic competition
from suppression, the former requires practically no direct showing of
actual or impending economic effects of the trade practice in question.
This note will examine the path taken by the court in determining
that the stricter law of tie-ins was the proper law to apply. In reaching
its determination on the applicable law, the Chicken Delight court set
up important and novel restrictions on what a trademark registrant
could do with his mark. These restrictions also require some review,
both for their relation to the law of trademarks as it has existed and
for the impact which such restrictions may have on the franchise
industry. Finally, this note will review the manner in which the law
of tie-ins was applied. That law has been in a state of some uncer-
tainty since 1969, yet the Chicken Delight court perceived "clear guide-
lines" and followed them to its conclusion. This note is primarily
concerned with whether the court in Chicken Delight, on its deter-
mination of the applicable law, on its application of that law, and
on its view of the nature of trademark-licensing and the franchise
industry, was indeed following "clear guidelines," or whether it was
establishing, granting clarity to, and then following its own guidelines.
The Tie-In Doctrine
Whenever a business organization sells a product desired by the
1. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3415 (Feb. 28,
1972). The Ninth Circuit affirmed and reversed in part the district court's decision
found at 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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public, it possesses a certain amount of market leverage. 2  As the
seller's control in the market for that product increases, whether
through monoply, market dominance, patent, copyright, or simply the
superiority of his product, this leverage increases.3 The most notice-
able result of such leverage may be a raise in price by the seller.
Another result may be an attempt by the seller to extend his favorable
market position into a different market by means of a "tie-in" or
"tying arrangement." 5 Under such an arrangement the buyer, in order
to purchase the desired or "tying" item, is forced by the seller to pur-
chase a less desired or "tied" item. The seller ties the two products
in order to carry over the strength he possesses in one market into
another separate and distinct market.' This practice has been sub-
ject to attack under three federal antitrust statutes.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares unlawful "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations."' Tying arrangements have been specifically held to fall
within this proscription. 8  Such arrangements may also be illegal under
section 3 of the Clayton Act, which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . .
to . . . make a . . . contract for the sale of . . . commodities
. . . on the condition . . . that the . . . purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the . . . commodities of a competitor . . . of
the . . . seller, where the effect . . . may be to substantially
lessen competition. 9
The Federal Trade Commission is also empowered to take action under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to eliminate tying
arrangements where those arrangements are deemed to be "unfair
methods of competition."' 10
The Supreme Court has developed doctrines under the above
2. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
3. Id. See also Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 502-04 (1969).
4. 394 U.S. at 503.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-47 (1962).
6. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (defendants
tied the desired purchase of land to the required use of their railroad services).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947) (defendants tied the desired lease of their patented salt dis-
pensing machines to the purchase of their salt products).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223
(1968), in which respondents tied their desired distributorships to the required pur-
chase from another company of tires, batteries, and accessories. Texaco then re-
ceived a commission. The case is clearly distinguishable from a classic tie-in
arrangement.
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described statutes to consistently defeat tying arrangements," and such
arrangements have been condemned as serving "hardly any purpose
beyond the suppression of competition.' 2 Generally speaking, the
economic evils presented by the traditional tie-in are the extension of
economic power from one market to another, and the resultant re-
straint of trade in the "tied" market.' 3 Competition in the tied market
is restrained in two ways: a buyer is prevented from exercising free
denied access to certain consumers.' 4 Any contract for the sale of
goods, services, or commodities effectively "restrains trade" because the
buyer has limited his choice of suppliers and is therefore no longer a
potential consumer of other suppliers. Therefore, for purposes of finding
an illegal tie-in, market extension and its anticompetitive effects are in-
separable considerations. Tying arrangement proscriptions will only be
employed to cure restraints of trade when the threatened restraints are
caused by attempts at market extension.' 5
Elements of an Illegal Tie-In
By definition the most basic prerequisite of an illegal tie-in is
the presence of two distinct products with two distinct markets.' 6
Without two products, no extrinsic leverage can be applied, and there
can be no extension of power from one market to another with a
concomitant restraint of trade in the second market.' 7  A determina-
tion of whether one or more products exist is not always as straight-
forward as might be imagined. While a left shoe is distinct from
a right shoe and a car is distinct from its tires, they are customarily
sold together. No court has ever suggested that tie-in principles should
be invoked to require separate sales of these items. Under certain
circumstances, however, there are single unit sales which involve
conceptually divisible and separate items. In such cases a court must
11. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
12. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
13. In Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)
the Court stated: "The essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of
economic leverage; a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand
his empire into the next."
14. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962).
15. See Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
16. See, e.g., id., in which advertising space in morning and evening news-
papers under the same ownership were viewed as a single product. The Court
commented: "In short, neither the rationale nor the doctrines evolved by the 'tying'
cases can dispose of the Publishing Company's arrangements challenged here."
17. When there are not two products for tying purposes, there still may be an
illegal restraint of trade. The applicability of exclusive dealing and requirements
contracts doctrines to the Chicken Delight agreements is discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 92-100 inIra.
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determine if the underlying rationale and purpose of the tie-in doctrine
require a finding that two individual products are involved in the
sale and are illegally tied together as a unit in derogation of free
competition. 18
With certain minor exceptions,' 9 a tying arrangement, if illegal
at all, will be found by the court to be illegal per se. This rule of
per se illegality has been developed2" to lessen the burden on the
plaintiff bringing suit under the Sherman Act of directly showing an
unreasonable restraint of trade, or if suit is brought under the Clayton
Act, of directly showing a substantial lessening of competition. If a
seller possesses a degree of market power in the tying market, and if a
"not insubstantial" volume of commerce in the tied market is affected,2'
then the court will hold a tying arrangement illegal per se.
22
Since the "wielding of economic power" is a basic feature of an
illegal tie-in, the nature of a seller's position in the tying market has
always been of great significance. Clearly, if a seller has little or no
power in his own market, it is unlikely that he can muster sufficient
leverage by virtue of that power to restrain competition in another
market. Thus, for there to be an illegal tie-in, there is a require-
ment that the seller possess a degree of market power in the tying
market.
The quantum of market power necessary for the court to find
liability under the tie-in doctrine has not remained constant. When
the Supreme Court first developed the doctrine of per se illegality,
the seller apparently had to have monopolistic power in the tying
market. 23  Subsequent cases, however, have shown that a tying arrange-
ment can be illegal per se where the seller's position is neither mono-
18. "[T]he only safe conclusion is that each case will be decided on an ad hoc
basis." Cooper, Bower, & Belcher, Product Distribution in ANTITRUST ADVISER § 3.15
at 90 (C. Hills ed. 1971).
19. Illegality may, under unusual circumstances, be established without resort to
the per se rule. However, this requires more elaborate proof. See note 53 & accom-
panying text infra.
20. As applied to tying arrangements, the doctrine of per se illegality began
with International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
21. Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States. 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953),
indicates that per se illegality under the Sherman Act requires a showing of both ele-
ments, while per se illegality under the Clayton Act requires either market power
or a showing of a "substantial" volume of business in the tied market. Whether the
"and/or" problem is critical or whether "not insubstantial" is far different from "sub-
stantial" is not clear. This distinction has been criticized. See, e.g., Handler, Anti-
trust: 1969, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 162 (1970); McCarthy, Trademark Franchising
and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1085, 1097 n.77 (1970).
22. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
23. Defendants in International Salt tied the lease of their patented salt dis-
pensers to the purchase of their salt products. The patent gave the defendants a
"monopolistic" position upon which the Court laid emphasis. Id. at 395-96.
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polistic, nor even "dominant." 24  The present standard of the amount
of market power necessary to lead to per se illegality is "sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain
free competition in the market for the tied product."25  Thus, the
standard for a crucial element of an illegal tying arrangement, mar-
ket power, is enmeshed with the very economic evil which the doctrine
seeks to remove. When the seller possesses sufficient power in one
market so that he is able to restrain competition by means of market
extension in another market, the requisite market power exists.
The inherent circuity in this "test" has been somewhat eliminated
by the addition of more objective tests which allow the court to infer
sufficient power in the tying market "from the tying product's desir-
ability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes."2 Moreover,
where a tying product is patented or copyrighted, sufficient economic
power is presumed to exist. This presumption was first recognized
in United States v. Loew's, Inc." In that case Loew's was pro-
hibited from offering its high-quality copyrighted movies to television
stations only on the condition that the stations accept its lower-quality
movies. Loew's market power was shown not by its relationship to
its competitors, but by the exclusivity of its copyrights.28 The fact
that a tying arrangement exists is itself evidence, though not conclu-
sive, that sufficient market power exists.29
In addition to the requirement of sufficient market power in the
tying market by the seller, per se illegality also requires that a "not
insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied market be affected by
the tying arrangement. ° This quantitative requirement as to the effect
of the tying arrangement in the tied market is not difficult to meet.
The standard is not related to a percentage of total business done
in the tied market but, instead, simply requires that the raw dollar
total of business in the tied market affected by the tying arrangement
24. A "dominant" market position was the apparent requirement applied in
Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953). The require-
ment for such extensive market power is no longer existent. See notes 25-26 infra
and text accompanying notes 25-29 infra.
25. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
26. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). Thus Loew's ar-
rangements to provide certain desired films only on condition that less desirable
films were also taken was an illegal tie-in. Loew's position in the quality film
market was neither monopolistic nor dominant, but the copyrighted films were
attractive to consumers and unique.
27. Id. at 45, 49-50.
28. Chicken Delight has attempted to expand this patent/copyright presumption
to trademarks. See text accompanying notes 106-09 infra.
29. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958).
30. Id. at 6.
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cannot be described as insubstantial. Thus, one defendant doing only
$60,800 in business in a multi-million dollar tied market was found
to have met the "not insubstantial" standard."
To briefly summarize then, a tying arrangement will almost always
be held to be illegal when the seller has sufficient power in the tying
market and32 does more than insubstantial business in the tied market.
Once these two elements have been established, only a very limited
set of justifications will exempt the seller from liability.
Defenses
Two recognized defenses to what would otherwise be an illegal
tie-in are the so-called "new business" justification, and the "quality
control" or "protection of goodwill" justification. The Supreme
Court first recognized the new business justification in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States,3 3 where it stated:
[U]nless the tying device is employed by a small company in an
attempt to break into a market . . . the use of a tying device
can rarely be harmonized with the strictures of the antitrust
laws . . .34
For example, the "new business" justification was recognized in a
situation involving a new enterprise in a highly sophisticated electronics
business. There, the court held that the newness of the business and
the scarcity of technology justified the tying arrangement which involved
the sale, as a unit, of various electronic components together with a
service contract.3  It is not clear at this time how far the courts
will be willing to allow the "new business" justification to extend. It
can be argued that the buyer's position as a new business may be as
relevant to the underlying rationale of the "new business" exception
as is the seller's. Under such a rationale, excuse might be found for
a tying arrangement which facilitates entry of a new business into a
competitive market of other buyers.30
Some employers of tying arrangements have escaped liability by
showing that the tie-in was necessary to control the quality and pre-
serve the goodwill of the tying item." This justification for a tying
31. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
32. See note 21 supra.
33. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
34. Id. at 330.
35. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557,
560-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afj'd per curiam 365 U.S. 567 (1961). The district court
held that this justification expired as relevant technology became available.
36. See text accompanying notes 123-24 infra.
37. See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 125 (1965) (defendants tied their trademark license to their ice cream mix
to maintain quality); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653
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arrangement may be more notable for the rather lame invocations of
it than for its history of acceptance by the courts. In the cases where
this justification for the tying arrangement was advanced, the court
appears more often to have devoted its efforts to denying the inherent
superiority of one company's rock salt8 or another company's com-
puter cards,3 9 for example, than to considering the alleged need to
control quality by means of a tie-in.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.
The most recent, and perhaps most confusing, tie-in decision of
the Supreme Court is Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp.40  In this case U. S. Steel, through-its wholly owned subsidiary,
U. S. Steel Homes Credit Corp., agreed to give Fortner Enterprises
100 percent financing at 6 percent interest on a venture which involved
the purchase of land and the installation of prefabricated houses. Fort-
ner agreed to purchase the houses from U. S. Steel, who took back
a mortgage on the land as security for the loan. Fortner was unable
to meet the loan payments and U. S. Steel began foreclosure pro-
ceedings. Shortly after the institution of foreclosure proceedings Fort-
ner sued U. S. Steel, alleging that they had imposed an illegal tying
arrangement on him, forcing him to buy their houses in order to
receive the credit financing when other houses in the market were
available for as much as $400 less. U. S. Steel moved for a summary
judgment, arguing that Fortner had failed to raise any triable issue
of fact.41 The trial court granted the motion, on the basis that Fortner
had not shown that U. S. Steel had sufficient market power over the
tying product, credit, to impose a tie-in which would be illegal per
se.42 The decision was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
without opinion.43  The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision and over
vigorous dissents, reversed.44 Justice Black, writing for the majority,
apparently relied on three grounds for reversing the lower court's
decision.
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961) (defendants tied the sale of patented
unloading machines to the sale of patented silos, after receiving complaints about the
unloaders when used with other silos).
38. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947).
39. IBM Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134 (1936).
40. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
41. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56.
42. 293 F. Supp. 762 (W.D. Ky.. 1966).
43. 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968).
44. Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan, felt that Fortner could meet no
market power test, and had offered no proof on the issue at trial. 394 U.S. at 510-20.
Justice Fortas, joined by Justice Stewart, argued that no tie-in existed at all. Id.
at 520-25.
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First, the granting of summary judgment for the defendants was
found erroneous on the basis that the lower court apparently utilized
an incorrect standard for market power sufficient to invoke the rule
of per se illegality.45  Justice Black made clear that neither monopo-
listic power nor market dominance was necessary, inferring that the
lower court had found them to be so. This statement of what is not
necessary to constitute sufficient market power cannot be said to
make Fortner a departure from earlier tie-in cases. Loew's had made
the same determination seven years earlier.46 What may have been
a departure from prior cases, and what has been responsible for some
confusion in cases decided subsequently was the following dictum in
Fortner:
[T]he proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the power
to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in,
with respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the
market.4
7
It is doubtful that Justice Black meant to imply that the mere
presence of a tie-in between the seller and "an appreciable number
of buyers" is conclusive on the issue of the market power of the seller.
In the first place, Fortner involved only one buyer, and secondly,
such an interpretation would, for most cases, eliminate the per se
rule as it had previously existed, and make all tie-ins illegal. 8 Such
an outcome would be an extraordinary deviation from the course of
prior Sherman and Clayton Act tie-in cases.49 Under prior cases,
45. Id. at 502-03. It was unclear, however, that the district court granted judg-
ment on the basis of no perceived monopoly or dominance. The district court
found that no evidence had been offered to demonstrate that U.S. Steel was powerful
enough in the tying market to pressure buyers into taking the tied product. 293 F.
Supp. 762, 768 (1966). This seems indistinguishable from the "sufficient power to
restrain" test of Northern Pacific which Fortner reiterated. 394 U.S. at 498-99. The
lower court did not make clear just what test it was applying, however.
46. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
47. 394 U.S. at 504.
48. To establish the dictum as law would be tantamount to establishing a per se
rule on market power, which is a necessary item in establishing the per se rule of
illegality. A seller who customarily used tying arrangements would have an "ap-
preciable number of buyers," and therefore, he would presumptively have so much
market power that unreasonable restraints of trade or a substantial lessening of com-
petition-those effects which the per se rule of illegality established-would be
inevitable.
49. No case has found that demonstration of the existence of tie-ins was in
itself demonstration of the existence of market power. See United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (fact that the tying items were copyrighted demon-
strated the seller's market power); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7
(1958) (defendant's market power over the tying item, land, was shown by the ex-
tensiveness and desirability of its land holdings); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) (power wielded by defendants was derived from
a "limited monopoly" over the tying item, a patented machine).
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tie-ins were illegal only because they were unreasonable restraints of
trade or substantially lessened competition." The per se rule was
developed to avoid the need for the plaintiff to show these general
market effects, provided, however, that he was able to establish cer-
tain elements which made such market effects inevitable-significant
market power in the tying product, and a not insubstantial amount
of commerce affected in the tied market. If the mere presence of a
tie-in is deemed to be determinative of market power, then illegality
is established without the necessity for a showing of illegal effect or
the necessary cause of that effect. Such a result would condemn all
tying arrangements on the basis of form, without regard to substance-
the harm which the antitrust laws sought to end. It does not appear
reasonable to assume that the five justices on the majority intended
to so change the rule of per se illegality without a more conclusive
statement than appears in Fortner.
A more reasonable interpretation would be that the market power
requirement of per se illegality is still to be utilized to establish the
coercive element of a tie-in. As Justice Black wrote in Northern
Pacific:
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the
tying product so that it does not represent an effectual weapon to
pressure buyers into taking the tied item any restraint of trade
attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be in-
significant at most.51
Thus, the mere presence of a tie-in with an appreciable number of
buyers should not be considered determinative of illegality; instead,
the fact that a tie-in exists should still be given the same weight as
Black ascribed to it in Northern Pacific, that is, "compelling evidence
of the defendant's great power, at least where, as here, no other
explanation has been offered for the existence of these restraints.
' 52
A second ground for the reversal of the summary judgment in
Fortner was the fact that the plaintiff could have possibly prevailed
even though he was unable to establish the applicability of the per
se rule. In other words, the plaintiff could have prevailed by show-
ing a violation of the general proscriptions of the Sherman or Clayton
Act on the part of the defendant. 53  The Court concluded, therefore,
that mere failure to invoke the rule of per se illegality did not lead
50. Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) with
Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953) and Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
51. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958).
52. Id. at 7-8.
53. That is, a Sherman Act plaintiff could demonstrate that a tie-in resulted
in an unreasonable restraint of trade, or a Clayton Act plaintiff could show that the
result was a substantial lessening of competition. The standards of legality would
SIEGEL v. CFHCKEN DELIGHT, INC. 1155April 1972]
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to an absence of triable issues and should not lead to summary judg-
ment on this basis alone." Finally, the Fortner court rested its deci-
sion on the general rule that courts should avoid summary judgment
in "complex antitrust litigations," 5 unless, of course, there are clearly
no triable issues.
In summary, Fortner appears to have been a rather narrow hold-
ing. The facts in the litigation presented triable issues, and summary
judgment was therefore held to be erroneous. The decision should
not be construed as drastically changing existing standards for per se
illegality; instead, the court appears to have merely reiterated three
established general principles: (1) market power does not require
either monoply or dominance, but instead enough power to coerce;
(2) a tie-in may prove to be illegal without application of the per
se rule; (3) summary judgment is generally to be avoided in complex
antitrust litigation.
While the broad language of Fortner has led some to construe
it as significantly altering the law of tie-ins, 6 the mere fact that the
Court utilized the established tie-in principles discussed above to save
so questionable a cause of action is what has given Fortner the appear-
ance of a trail-blazing decision. Fortner Enterprises was a corporate
shell with a $16,000 deficit when it went to U. S. Steel seeking fi-
nancing for a subdivision. It is doubtful whether the project would
have even been undertaken without the help of U. S. Steel, and it
was also clearly established that U. S. Steel does not treat 100 percent
financing at 6 percent interest as a separate product. In view of
these facts, it is difficult to see just how Fortner was harmed by this
arrangement with U. S. Steel, and more importantly, how competition
was harmed. The primary significance of the Fortner decision may
well be that courts are directed to insure that antitrust litigants are
allowed to reach a jury.
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.
Chicken Delight became a pioneer in the fast food franchise
business when it commenced operation in 1952. Its method of opera-
be those which existed prior to International Salt. See, e.g., IBM Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131, 135-36 (1935).
54. 394 U.S. at 499-500.
55. Id. at 500. In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962),
the Court stated: "We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in
complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles. . . . Trial by
affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of
,even handed justice.'"
56. See generally Advanced Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp.,
415 F.2d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). See also
McCarthy, supra note 14, at 1103-05.
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tion was somewhat unusual in that, unlike most other franchisors, it
charged no initial fee nor any continuing royalty for the right of
franchisees to operate as a Chicken Delight outlet. Instead, the only
quid pro quo in the franchise agreements was the obligation of the
franchisees to purchase certain cooking equipment, dip and spice mix,
and certain trademark-bearing paper products exclusively from the
franchisor.5 7  Chicken Delight never marketed these products sep-
arately from its franchises.
In a class action representing approximately 700 franchisees, the
Chicken Delight arrangement was attacked as a tie-in-illegal under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.58 The alleged tying product was the
Chicken Delight trademark license; the tied items were said to be the
products which franchisees were required to purchase from Chicken
Delight. The district court determined as matters of law that a tie-in
existed;59 that the requisite market power in the tying market was
present; 0 that sufficient commerce was affected in the tied markets61
to invoke the per se rule of illegality; and that with respect to the
paper products, no justifications existed for the tie-in. 62 A verdict was
directed for plaintiffs on all these issues.A3  The only questions to
reach the jury were whether purchase of the equipment or the spice
mix could be justified as quality control devices. By special verdicts,
the jury determined that they could not.64 The district court did not
determine the extent of damages, but it did find, again as a matter
of law, that damages existed.65 The measure of damages was held
to be the amount of the price for the tied items in excess of their
fair market value. The court rejected Chicken Delight's contention
that if damages existed they must be offset by the reasonable value
of the trademark license. Since Chicken Delight purported to charge
57. The goods were priced apparently in excess of market value, but the prices
were specified in the agreement. Any increase in price was conditioned upon
increases in cost to the franchisor. A franchise agreement is set out in Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari, App. C, Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Siegel, 40 U.S.L.W. 3415
(U.S. Feb. 28, 1972).
58. The case was not tried under the Clayton Act because of its restriction to
the tying of "commodities." The action was held maintainable as a class action under
F.m. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3), 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967), but an additional
charge of price fixing was held to be inappropriate to the class action. Chicken
Delight v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969).
59. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 849 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
aff'd 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
60. Id. at 849-50.
61. Id. at 850.
62. Id. at 851-52.
63. Id. at 852.
64. Id. at 853.
65. Id. at 852.
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no fees or royalties for use of the mark, the trial court held that it
would not "restructure" the contract by allowing an offset. 6
Upon appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the lower
court was affirmed except for the issue of damages.0 7  On that issue
the appellate court found that the fact of damages had been neither
established nor controverted in the lower court. Actual damages
would exist, said the court, only where the reasonable value of the
tying and tied products together was less than the overcharges on the
tied items.68 The court thus accepted Chicken Delight's position on
the setoff issue, but rejected the contention that since franchisees had
accepted the overcharges on the tied items as the cost of the tying
items, they were undamaged as a matter of law.6 9
The balance of this note will review the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit on the issues of the applicability of the law of tie-ins and the
questions of market power and justifications, and will also examine alter-
natives which might have been available as the basis for decision.
This discussion will also consider the question as to whether the deci-
sion is promotive of competition.
The Two Product Requirement
As has been noted earlier, the most basic requirement of any
tie-in is the existence of two products-the tying product, and the
tied product.70 The tying product is desired by the buyer, and this
gives the seller a degree of power in this market. The tied product
is not necessarily as desired, but the seller requires its purchase as
a condition for providing the tying product to the buyer. The motive
behind the tying arrangement is the translation of power in one market
by the seller, to power in another market, and the resulting economic
evil is the achievement of power in the second market gained only
through coercive application of power in the first. It is possible that
more than one product may be involved in a package sale which
does not constitute a tie-in. This situation would arise where no
single product could be said to be the tying item, for it lacks the
desirability which would make it a coervice tool. Thus, with no dom-
inant product among the several products offered, there is no coercion,
no market extension, and no tie-in.7 1  There still may be a violation
66. See id.
67. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 53 (9th Cir. 1971).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 52-53.
70. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
71. Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 n.8 (1948). In
Standard Oil defendants required contracting service stations to purchase all their
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of the rules proscribing certain exclusive dealing arrangements, how-
ever.7
2
Two prerequisite findings existed, then, before Chicken Delight
could be said to be in violation of tie-in law: (1) that more than
one product existed; and (2) that among the separate products, there
was one dominant tying product whose power the seller wielded to
extend his position into other markets. Since Chicken Delight is the
only case in which tie-in liability has been found where the alleged
tying item was a trademark license, the nature of a trademark and
its capacity to serve as a tying item merit close scrutiny.
The Lanham Trade Mark Act of 1946 '  defines a trade-
mark as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify
his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others.174  Obviously, this definition does not lend itself readily to a
conclusion that a trademark is an item separate and distinct from
that which it describes. Furthermore, an early Supreme Court deci-
sion implies a certain unity in the trademark and that which it identi-
fies:
There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connec-
tion with which the mark is employed.
75
Only one decision, Susser v. Carvel Corp.,7 6 has directly held
that a trademark license can be considered as an item sufficiently
separate from the products which it identifies to be susceptible of
characterization as a tying item. But in Susser, which involved the
licensing of a trademark on the condition that the franchisee buy
certain supplies from the franchisor, a majority of the court found no
tie-in liability. The court held that no sufficient market power in
the market for the tying item was shown, and that the buying restric-
gasoline, tires, tubes, and accessories exclusively from Standard Oil. Though the
Court "noted in passing" in its footnote number 8 that "as a matter of classification"
the tires, tubes, and accessories might be viewed as "tied products," the opinion was
devoted to explaining and applying a standard of legality for exclusive dealing arrange-
ments which was different from that for tie-ins. The central element distinguishing
tie-ins from exclusive dealing arrangements did not appear to be that the former
merely involved two products while the latter involved only one. Rather, the crucial
distinction was that tie-ins were almost always motivated only by a desire to extend
power from one market to another, using the dominant desired product to "suppress
competition" in the markets for other products, while exclusive dealing arrange-
ments could serve legitimate purposes.
72. See text accompanying notes 92-100 infra.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-21, 1123-27 (1970).
74. Id. § 1127.
75. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
76. 332 F.2d 505, 513, 519 (2d Cir. 1964).
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tions imposed by the franchisor were justifiable as quality control devices
to maintain a uniform product-soft ice cream.
The same franchise agreement was again examined by the Federal
Trade Commission after the decision in Susser,77 and a quite different
conclusion was reached by the commission on the characterization of
a trademark as a tying item:
[The] franchise agreements cannot be regarded as tie-in arrange-
ments because the trademark license conceptually cannot consti-
tute a "tying" product, and, even if it could, it could never be
regarded as a separable "product" apart from the mix and com-
missary items to which it is attached within the meaning of the
typical tie-in arrangement.7 8
The appellate court in Chicken Delight viewed the trademark,
as it is used in the fast food industry, as constituting merely a repre-
sentation of quality. The court concluded that the marketing of license
and goods could only be justified where there is no less restrictive
means available to maintain the quality represented by the trade-
mark.7 9 The court thus took the position that a trademark, for tie-in
purposes, was always separable from other items in a franchise system,
and where the licensing agreement required purchase of certain items,
a tie-in was present. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the develop-
ment of the law of trademarks.
Historically, a trademark represented the source of a product sold
under that mark. This source theory was so firmly established that
it was said that a trademark could neither be assigned nor licensed
"except as incidental to a transfer of the business or property in con-
nection with which it has been used. '80  In other words, a trade-
mark could never be marketed separately. This restriction was removed
by the Lanham Act, which provided that one company's trademark
could be used by a "related company" so long as "such mark is not
used in such manner as to deceive the public."' 81 With this right to
license a trademark went the affirmative duty on the part of the licensor
to control the licensee "in respect to the nature and the quality of
the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used.
'8 2
Failure to exercise such control could amount to abandonment of the
trademark.
8 3
77. Carvel Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TADE REaG. REP. 17,298 at
22,422 (1965).
78. Id. at 22,425.
79. 448 F.2d 43, 49, 50 (1971).
80. Macmahan Pharmical Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474-75
(8th Cir. 1901).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1970).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1115(b)(3) (1970).
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A trademark, therefore, may or may not represent the source of
the product sold under the mark, but it always must represent the
quality of the product. Clearly there is no requirement that a trade-
mark can represent only quality. More importantly, even though
Congress opened the door for trademark licensing, it did not make
a trademark a product rather than a label, nor did it put forth prohi-
bitions against coupling the license with purchase of other items. This
cannot be said to be an oversight, for the same act expressly recognized
violation of the antitrust laws as a defense to an action for trademark
infringement.84 Had Congress wished to make illegal the marketing
of a trademark license together with related but conceptually distinct
products, it could have done so. It did not. Indeed, as a practical
matter, Congress, by putting a strict burden of quality control on any
trademark licensor, required the licensor to market the trademark
together with whatever products were essential for maintenace of a
uniform standard of quality. Congress made no prohibitions where
such joint sales are a convenient, though not essential means of quality
control. In making such a prohibition, the court in Chicken Delight
has no support from federal trademark legislation.
In its conclusion that a trademark license must be marketed apart
from other items in order to avoid possible liability as a tie-in, the
Chicken Delight court apparently found as significant the fact that
other fast-food franchisors did market their licenses separately.85 Yet,
this fact alone is clearly not conclusive of a tying arrangement. As
was stated in Jerrold Electronics v. United States:
[A] manufacturer cannot be forced to deal in the minimum prod-
uct that could be sold or is usually sold. On the other hand, it is
equally clear that one cannot circumvent the antitrust laws simply
by claiming that he is selling a single product. The facts must
be examined to ascertain whether or not there are legitimate
reasons for selling normally separate items in a combined form
to dispel any inferences that it is really a disguised tie-in.8 6
The question in Chicken Delight, then, should not have been
whether the tying of one product, the trademark license, to other
goods was justified, but whether what was marketed was in fact a
single system or separate items.8 7 The question should have been
one of fact, not one of law, and the determination should have been
made based on the particular facts of the case. The fact that the
franchisor in Chicken Delight charged no separate initial fee or royalties
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1970). See text accompanying note 109 infra.
85. 448 F.2d at 48 n.4.
86. 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567
(1961).
87. See generally Note, Tying Arrangements and the Single Product Issue, 31
Omo S.LJ. 861 (1970).
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for the use of its trademark, and that the trademark had never been
marketed separately from the alleged "tied" products or, for that
matter, the "tied" products separately from the trademark s were all
factors which should have been considered in determining whether the
franchise arrangement was properly classified as a tie-in in the first
place.
By its restrictive view of the trademark as an item separate and
distinct from every item not essential to quality control, the court in
Chicken Delight allowed its determination of the two-product question
to be governed by considerations more relevant to the question of
whether the almost-assumed tie was justified as a means of quality
control.8 9 Whether a tie-in was present should have been determined
by the court independently of considerations of possible justifications
for the tie-in. There is no authority, either in the Lanham Act or
elsewhere, that a trademark-licensing arrangement must be handled
as a single complete transaction, disassociated from any other purchase
requirements. If a trademark is part of a marketing system, and if
within that system it cannot be disassociated from the other products
in the system, then the trademark should not be considered a tying
item. Even if the items in the system can be marketed separately,
the law does not require that that possibility be the requirement.9
The marketing system may be a result of legitimate business purposes
and not of a desire to extend market power and suppress competi-
tion.91 The process of determining whether two products exist and
are tied for purposes of the tie-in laws is not mechanical. The defend-
ant's motive and purpose, his past and contemporaneous methods of
dealing in the allegedly separate products consituting the system under
review, the nature of the alleged tying item, and the practices of his
competitors are all relevant considerations. Contrary to the view
implicit in Chicken Delight, these are considerations for the determina-
tion of whether a tie exists at all, not whether it is justified. And
contrary to the action taken in Chicken Delight, these issues present
questions of fact, the resolution of which is properly within the prov-
ince of a jury rather than a judge.
As has been discussed previously, the existence of two distinct
88. Cf. Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv. Bureau, 4 Cal. 3d 842, 858-59,
484 P.2d 953, 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785, 796 (1971). The case concerned an alleged
tie-in, illegal under California's Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720,
16726 (West 1964). Whether the seller ever marketed the products separately was
viewed as one factor to consider in the factual determination of whether two products
existed.
89. See 448 F.2d at 48-49.
90. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
91. Id.
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products is the most basic prerequisite of a tying arrangement, for
without two products the economic evil of market extension is not
present, and there is no reason to apply the strict per se rule. Even
if a court can find separate products, it still must find that the defend-
ant developed power in one market which it then used to coerce
purchases in another market. Simply stated, there must be one of
the separate products which can be characterized as the tying item,
the vehicle of the market extension. Since Chicken Delight has oper-
ated under the same system since its inception, it is impossible to say
that it developed power in one market and then extended it into
another. Two questions, then, were handled too blithely by the court
in Chicken Delight: were the products involved in the Chicken
Delight system as a matter of law necessarily distinct, and did Chicken
Delight use a dominant product in that system to extend power in
its market into other markets?
Exclusive Dealing
Even though the discussion above may indicate that the rules
of law proscribing tying arrangements should not have been applied
to the Chicken Delight arrangement, this would not necessarily mean,
under the facts in Chicken Delight, that the franchise agreements
were immune from attack under other antitrust regulations.9" The
franchisor in Chicken Delight required the franchisees to purchase
certain of their requirements exclusively from one source. The anti-
trust tests regarding requirements contracts and exclusive dealing con-
tracts could have been, and perhaps should have been applied to the
franchise agreements to determine whether there were materially dele-
terious effects on competition. Unlike tying arrangements, exclusive
dealing and requirements contracts do not involve the wielding of
economic power outside of the seller's own market.9" Since the eco-
nomic evils which inhere in the typical tie-in-coercive control in
other markets-are not necessarily found in a requirements or exclu-
sive dealing arrangement, no rule of per se illegality has been developed.
Exclusive dealing or requirements contract arrangements may be
92. The courts have never taken the position that trademark licensors are im-
mune from antitrust regulations. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1951). The Lanham Trade Mark Act itself penalizes
the use of a trademark "to violate the antitrust laws of the United States." 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1970).
93. The argument can be made that exclusive dealing or requirements contracts
also involve a form of tying arrangement in that the purchase of a certain amount of
the seller's product is tied to purchase of the balance of the buyer's requirements.
However, since there is no element of market extension, no such application of tie-in
law has been made. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 1243, Chicken Delight,
Inc. v. Siegel, 40 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1972).
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illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act or under the more specific
provision of section 3 of the Clayton Act.94 There are two general
tests of illegality for this type of contract: the "quantitative substan-
tiality" test of Standard Oil Co. v. United States,9" and the "qualitative
substantiality" test of Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.96
Under the former and earlier decision, the threat of a substantial les-
sening of competition sufficient to make the contract illegal is deemed
present when the arrangement forecloses enough competition so that
a substantial portion of commerce is affected in the relevant market.
97
The "qualitative substantiality" test of Tampa Electric on the other
hand takes into consideration more factors than simply the relative
quantity of commerce affected. The relevant considerations for eval-
uating the quality of the restraints imposed by the contract are:
[T]he relative strength of the parties, the proportionate vol-
ume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of com-
merce in the relevant market area, and the probable immediate
and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the market
might have on effective competition.98
The Court in Tampa Electric did not purport to overrule the
earlier quantitative test, nor did it make clear what weight was to be
given to the various criteria for substantiality which it put forward.
But whatever test is to be applied, whether quantitative, qualitative,
or a hybrid test, the test to be applied is less onerous than the test
of a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied market, which
is the second requirement of the tie-in rule of per se illegality.99 Thus,
94. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
95. 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Standard Oil had exclusive supply contracts with
16% of retail outlets in the Western United States. Those dealers purchased $65
million worth of products under the contracts. These facts, coupled with the fact
that most other suppliers in the area used the same arrangement, established a
quantitatively substantial lessening of competition.
96. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). Tampa Electric Company agreed to purchase all of
its coal requirements for a twenty-four-year period from Nashville Coal Company.
Despite a large dollar volume involved, the Court found no qualitative substantiality.
The reasons were that Nashville was only one of 700 suppliers in the market, the
contract did not involve a substantial number of outlets, and the contract served
legitimate business needs.
97. 337 U.S. at 314. In Standard Oil foreclosure of 6.7% of the relevant market
met this test.
98. 365 U.S. at 329.
99. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra. An amount of commerce which
is not de minimis is enough for tie-in purposes. The Tampa decision involved a
twenty-four-year coal supply contract which was clearly not de minimis, and still
found the agreement to be legal. The widely differing amounts of restriction which
are tolerated under exclusive dealing arrangements as opposed to tying arrangements
suggest the importance for a court to determine whether there is need to apply the
latter construction when the arrangement is susceptible of either description. Where
there is "hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition" for the arrange-
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the fact that the court applied the law relative to tie-ins, rather than
the law of exclusive dealing arrangements in Chicken Delight, should
such law have been applicable, was harmful error on the part of the
court.100
The Market Power Issue
Even if it were assumed that the court in Chicken Delight cor-
rectly characterized the franchise agreement as a tying arrangement,
the court's summary handling of the issue of market power is highly
questionable. The lower court directed a verdict, finding market
power as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed. 0 1  The
district court had justified a directed verdict on the issue of market
power in the following manner:
To enmesh the jury in the rubric of market power in light of the
clear guidelines laid down in [Northern Pacific, Loew's, and
Fortner] should be unnecessary. This Court clearly may and
does rule upon this question as a matter of law.'
02
With the exception of patented and copyrighted tying items, for
which a court will accord a presumption of market power, 0 3 the
ment, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949), or where a
seller "wields his economic power" to "exploit" his position of strength and "expand
his empire," Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953), the
stricter standard should apply. Where none of these descriptions are accurate, no
purpose is served by a mechanical application of the doctrine of per se illegality for
tie-ins. See Standard Oil, supra, at 306-07.
Plaintiffs in Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 125 (1965), argued that the franchise arrangement of defendant violated
both tie-in and exclusive dealing standards. In regard to the latter issue, the court
stated: "Instead of introducing evidence to establish the economic effects of the
Carvel franchise structure, they merely protest that anti-competitive effects may be
inferred solely from the existence of such a network of exclusive dealerships. But the
whole tenor of Tampa Electric does not permit adherence to such a stringent standard
of legality." Id. at 516.
See also Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 993 (1964).
100. Plaintiffs stipulated in Chicken Delight that defendant's business in the
"tied" markets at no time exceeded 1% of the relevant markets. Since the require-
ment of the per se rule regarding tie-ins required only more than a de minimis, the
comparative volume figure was immaterial. Comparative volume would be extremely
significant under either the quantitative or qualitative substantiality test for exclusive
dealing arrangements.
101. "The District Court ruled, however, that Chicken Delight's unique registered
trade-mark, in combination with its demonstrated power to impose a tie-in, established
as a matter of law the existence of sufficient market power to bring the case within
the Sherman Act. We agree." 488 F.2d at 49 (emphasis added).
102. 311 F. Supp. at 849. The court's logic here might be questioned: "clear
guidelines" are presumably what prevent a jury from becoming "enmeshed" in "ru-
brics."
103. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1962).
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guidelines for market power are not quite as clear as the court's
language would suggest. This would appear to be particularly true
in Chicken Delight, in light of the fact that a trademark license has
never before been found to carry sufficient market power to bring
such an arrangement within the rule of per se illegality. In fact,
Susser is the only prior case to directly hold a trademark license to be a
tying item, and the court there found no liability for the reason that
no sufficient market power was demonstrated." 4 The appellate court,
acknowledged Susser in a footnote, however, and suggested that the
decision has been overruled by Fortner.1'0
To reach its conclusion on the presence of market power, the
appellate court in Chicken Delight took the unprecedented position
that the presumption of economic power which had been recognized
in Loew's, where a copyrighted item was involved,' 0 6 applied as well
to trademarks:
Just as the patent or copyright forecloses competitors from offer-
ing the distinctive product on the market, so the registered trade-
mark presents a legal barrier against competition. . . . Accord-
ingly we see no reason why the presumption that exists in the case
of the patent and copyright does not equally apply to the trade-
mark. 107
Such a conclusion by the court presents conceptual as well as legal
problems. In Loew's the copyrighted item presumptively carried mar-
ket power because of a statutorily afforded monopoly. It was the
product, and not its attendant copyright, which was used as the tying
item. The arrangement in Loew's did not tie the copyright to the
movie, but the copyrighted movie to other items. The court's reason-
ing, which equates copyrights and trademarks, would be sound if a
system identified by a trademark were offered only on condition that
the buyer also purchase some product not within the system. Of
course, there was no such alleged tie in Chicken Delight.'0°
104. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 125 (1965).
105. 488 F.2d at 50 n.7. Susser found no market power both by applying
traditional standards and by rejecting the idea that a trademark carried a presumption of
market power. Chicken Delight's assumption, expressed in a footnote, that Fortner
affected Susser's determination on the nature of a trademark is too facile a dismissal
of Susser and an unwarranted application of Fortner. See text accompanying notes
40-55 supra & note 107 & accompanying text infra.
106. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
107. 488 F.2d at 50. This presumption was expressly rejected by a majority in
Susser. 332 F.2d at 519. Chicken Delight's position that Fortner overruled Susser
on this point is questionable in view of the fact that Fortner dealt with neither
patents, copyrights, trademarks, nor directed verdicts finding market power as a matter
of law.
108. Symbolically stated, A, a patent, copyright, or trademark, identifies B, a
product or system. Loew's said that AB carries a presumption of market power
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That there is an essential difference between patents and copy-
rights on the one hand, and trademarks on the other, is pointed up
most clearly by the widely differing effectiveness of alleging violation
of antitrust laws as a defense to a charge of patent or copyright infringe-
ment and trademark infringement. In the latter case, the defense is
rarely successful. A recent decision illustrates the reasoning of the
courts:
[A] patent represents a grant of a limited monopoly that in most
instances would, absent its legalization by Congress, constitute an
unlawful restraint of trade . . . A valid trademark, on the
other hand, merely enables the owner to bar others from use of the
mark, as distinguished from competitive manufacture and sale of
identical goods bearing another mark, or even no mark at all,
since the purpose of trademark enforcement is to avoid public
confusion ....
Thus, although misuse of a patent almost inevitably is ac-
companied by unlawful restraints, the opportunity for effective
antitrust misuse of a trademark, as distinguished from collateral
anti-competitive activities on the part of the manufacturer or
seller of the goods bearing the mark, is so limited that it poses a
far less serious threat to the economic health of the nation.109
Thus, the court in Chicken Delight, without any judicial support
and in fact contrary to decided cases, treated patents, copyrights, and
trademarks as equals for purposes of tie-in arrangements. Perhaps
realizing the precariousness of its position, the court also attempted
to justify its directed verdict regarding market power on the "clear
guidelines" established in the prior tie-in cases. Regrettably, the clar-
ity of the guidelines established in these prior cases do not lend sup-
port to the court's decision.
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit in Chicken Delight
cited Fortner as support for granting a directed verdict. Apparently
disregarded by the courts is the fact that the Court in Fortner reversed
a directed verdict for the defendants, and remanded the case so that
a jury could determine the issues. Indeed, the Court went out of its
way to discuss the general inapplicability of directed verdicts and sum-
mary judgments in complex antitrust cases." 0
Fortner did contain dictum to the effect that market power may
exist when the seller has the power to "impose other burdensome
terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of
when its purchase is tied to another product, C. chicken Delight argues that A,
when it is a trademark, carries a presumption when its purchase is "tied" to B.
See the discussion of the single product issue at text accompanying notes 73-91 supra.
109. Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Zeiss, lena, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), ajf'd as modified on other grounds, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970).
110. See note 55 & accompanying text supra.
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buyers within the market.""' However, the Fortner dictum in no
way justifies a directed verdict under the facts of Chicken Delight.
In the first place, it is questionable to accord such weight to dictum.
Secondly, the Court was not providing a determinative test, but rather
a "proper focus of concern." '112 And thirdly, the existence of a tying
arrangement with an appreciable number of buyers is not the equiva-
lent of the imposition of a tying arrangement on an appreciable number
of buyers. Since the element of coercion is central to the rationale
of tie-in law, finding liability without that element appears to go be-
yond the purpose of the proscription.
In addition, the error in the court's premise that the guidelines
for market power are clear is reflected in the subsequent litigation in
Fortner after remand by the Supreme Court. On remand, the district
court, which had first directed a verdict for the defendant, directed
a verdict for the plaintiff!:"' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and again remanded the case to the district court:
In Advance Business Systems & Supplies Co. v. SCM Corporation
• .. the Court, as the plaintiff argues, interpreted Fortner as
holding that ". . . the 'sufficient economic power' test of per se
illegality is satisfied when it appears that the seller has the power to
'impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in with respect to
any appreciable number of buyers within the market.'" Plain-
tiff in its brief relies upon this interpretation and insists that
the directed verdict in its favor was justified on the basis of this
interpretation of Fortner by the Fourth Circuit. As we read the
majority opinion in Fortner, the holding was that a tying arrange-
ment achieves an unlawful restraint when "the seller can exert
some power over some of the buyers in the market." The ma-
jority opinion did not hold that the acceptance of a tie-in by cus-
tomers without more is proof of economic power. If the ma-
jority had intended to indicate that acceptance of a tie-in by an
appreciable number of customers is sufficient proof of the req-
uisite economic power, it would have been sufficient for Mr.
Justice Black to have said so .... 114
The Ninth Circuit in Chicken Delight, the Second Circuit in
Susser, the Fourth Circuit in Advanced Business Systems, and the
Sixth Circuit in Fortner appear to be at odds as to the requirement
for determining market power. Whatever "clear guidelines" may exist
on the subject of market power, such guidelines would not appear
to indicate that the tying arrangement in Chicken Delight-a question-
111. 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969). The statement was dictum because the case
did not involve "an appreciable number of buyers."
112. Id.
113. Judgment entered Nov. 23, 1970 (W.D. Ky.).
114. 452 F.2d 1065, 1103 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3542 (U.S.
May 15, 1972), quoting Advance Business Systems & Supplies Co. v. SCM Corp., 415
F.2d 55, 68 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
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able finding in itself-demonstrates sufficient market power merely
by its existence. Perhaps, the jury should have been allowed to
determine whether there was sufficient power to coerce, whether there
was in fact coercion, and whether such coercion was wielded with
the motive of market extension.
Franchising and the Law of Tie-ins
Regardless of the propriety of the courts' interpretation of various
tie-in standards in Chicken Delight, an important policy issue still
remains-the desirability of imposing the law of tie-ins on the trade-
mark-licensing form of franchising. The franchise industry is clearly
an important and rapidly expanding force in the national economy."'
Further, the industry is just as clearly susceptible to many of the
same trade regulation problems as are other industries, most notably
misrepresentation by the franchisor in the marketing of franchises," 6
and possible anticompetitive practices in controlling franchisees.1
17
The issue which should be deemed central to the Chicken
Delight litigation is whether there are sufficently compelling reasons
to deal with purchasing restrictions in franchise agreements under the
law of tie-ins rather than the law of exclusive dealing arrangements.
The practical difference, as has been discussed above, is the amount
of proof as to actual or potential anticompetitive effects which will
be required under the two bodies of law. A dollar volume in "tied"
goods which is more than de minimis is sufficient to meet the second
half of the per se rule of illegality for tie-ins. However, this same
volume might at the same time represent only a small percentage--
either quantitatively or qualitatively-of the business in the relevant
market and would thus be deemed of no "significant substantiality"
under the exclusive dealing rule." The reason for the difference
in the quantum of proof required under the two bodies of law is that
exclusive dealing arrangements are not generally deemed to be inher-
ently bad, as are tying arrangements, probably because they do not
115. Estimates on the number of franchise outlets range as high as 700,000,
the dollar volume as high as $125 billion, and the percentage of existing franchises not
in business in 1954 as high as 90%. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, BACKGROUND PAPER,
PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE: DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROH3MrONS
CONCERNING FRANCHISING 5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FTC BACKGROUND PAPER].
116. This appears to be the area of greatest concern to the FTC. Such practices
as hidden costs, inflated claims, inactive franchisors, and unreasonable termination
provisions are suspect. See generally FTC BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 115.
117. In an FTC discussion of buying restrictions in franchise agreements, the
analysis was commenced by reference to Standard Oil and Tampa Electric, the
leading exclusive dealing decisions. FEDERAL TRADE Cm'N, REPORT OF AD Hoc
COMMITTEE ON FRANCmSING 14 (June 2, 1969).
118. See text accompanying notes 92-100 supra.
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involve as their primary purpose the transference of market power
from one market to another. Exclusive dealing arrangements often
represent quite reasonable business aims which serve the economy. 1'9
Such dealing arrangements should be curbed, therefore, only when
the threat to competition is substantial. Even though the franchise
arrangements in Chicken Delight appear to represent such exclusive
dealing arrangements, the court applied the stricter law of tie-ins, and
found the franchise agreements violative of antitrust law. The court
appears to have completely disregarded the impact of the decision on
the individuals who may in the end be most intimately affected-the
franchisees.
Franchising arrangements offer many advantages to the franchisee,
among which is the opportunity for an individual to beome an inde-
pendent businessman, operating a business which has an immediate
reputation. While this aspect of franchising has been viewed as less
than a completely accurate recognition of the balance of power
between franchisor and franchisee, it has not gone without judicial
recognition:
The franchise method of operation has the advantage, from the
standpoint of our American system of competitive economy, of
enabling numerous groups of individuals with small capital to
become entrepreneurs. . . . If our economy had not developed
that system of operation, these individuals would have turned
out to have been merely employees.1
20
It may well be that the franchise arrangements in Chicken Delight,
which involved no initial license fee-which sometimes run from
$50,000-$100,000 in the fast-food industry121-allowed an indi-
vidual to become an instant businessman more easily than other types
of franchise arrangements. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that
the "no initial cost" arrangement of Chicken Delight franchises is
now a thing of the past.
A franchise agreement necessarily involves some amount of con-
trol which might arguably be characterized as tying. A trademark
owner, who utilizes the trademark as the basis for a franchise agree-
ment, but who does nothing to maintain the distinctive nature of the
trademark may be deemed by the courts to have abandoned it. 22 In
order to protect his trademark, therefore, he may require the franchisee
to purchase certain items deemed essential to the maintenance of a
119. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
120. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
121. FTC BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 115, at 5.
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (1970). See generally Rudnick, The Franchisor's
Dilemma: Can He Satisfy the Legal and Commercial Requirements of a Trademark
Licensing System Without Exposing Himself to Other Legal Risks, 56 TRADEMARK
REP. 621 (1966).
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uniform standard of quality; he may also, by some accounting pro-
cedure, require participation by the franchisee in the advertising of the
trademark; he may require use of specified building designs, and so
on. The need for quality control of the product produced by the
franchisee is particularly crucial in the fast-food business, where a
uniform taste and quality is essential to the value of the trademark
as an identifying symbol. The required purchase of cooking equip-
ment and spice mixes, when that is a reasonable device for quality
control,' 23 should be restricted by the courts only when the effect on
competition is or may be substantially adverse, and not simply when
the dollar volume in the goods is more than de minimis. There is
simply no compelling reason to apply the law of tie-ins to such franchise
arrangements when the goal of free competition can be served as
well through the use of exclusive dealing guidelines. To expose
franchisors to litigation'24 merely for requiring purchases aimed at
protecting product integrity, and which pose no substantial threat to
competition, and further to force the franchisor to prove that there
was no practical alternative to the arrangements with his franchisees, is
to place an unfair burden on the industry.
In Standard Oil the court established the test for determining
the illegality of exclusive dealing arrangements, and in doing so pointed
out potential benefits to society of such arrangements:
Requirements contracts, on the other hand, may well be of eco-
nomic advantage to buyers as well as sellers, and thus indirectly
of advantage to the consuming public. In the case of the buyer,
they may assure supply, afford protection against rises in price,
enable long-term planning on the basis of known costs, and obviate
the expense and risk of storage in the quantity necessary for a
commodity having a fluctuating demand. From the seller's point
of view, requirements contracts may make possible the substan-
tial reduction of selling expenses, give protection against price
fluctuations, and-of particular advantage to a newcomer in the
field to whom it is important to know what capital expenditures are
justified-offer the possibility of a predictable market. . . . Since
these advantages of requirements contracts may often be sufficient
to account for their use, the coverage by such contracts of a sub-
123. The court in Chicken Delight instructed the jury that the tie-in justification
of quality control would apply only if there was no other practical way to reach that
end. Other methods may be "practical" while being unduly burdensome. It is ar-
guable that more leeway should be provided when food is involved. Cf. Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 520 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
This would recognize the fact that a trademark is of value only when it elicits a favorable
impression of quality. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
124. The threat of a wave of litigation is not merely speculative. Chicken De-
light, in its Supreme Court brief, supra note 93, at App. D, presented a list of 39
pending cases with issues common to those in Chicken Delight.
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stantial amount of business affords a weaker basis for the infer-
ence that competition may be lessened than would similar coverage
by tying clauses. . . . And so we could not dispose of this case
merely by citing International Salt Co. v. United States [and its
rule of per se illegality for tying arrangements]. 125
The potential advantages discussed in Standard Oil have particu-
lar application to the franchising arrangement in Chicken Delight.
In addition, the franchising arrangements provided the further advan-
tage to the franchisee of a lower initial cost for entry into the market,
and the further advantages to the franchisor of a convenient method
for quality control, particularly essential when the product is food,126
and for realization of the value of the trademark.
To condemn any change in the law by judicial decision as "judicial
legislating" is unreasonable. But such criticism appears fully justified
when a decision has the potential effect of decreeing the one legal
method by which a franchisor can market his distinctive trademark
and its identified product. An inherent risk in a result such as
Chicken Delight's is that it might lead to company-owned outlets
rather than independent businesses. Such a result would entail large,
vertically-integrated companies and would ultimately result in a net
loss for the interests of free competition. Justice Douglas recognized
this potential danger in his dissent in Standard Oil:
[W]e can expect that the oil companies will move in to supplant
[the independent stations] with their own stations. There will
still be competition between the oil companies. But there will
be a tragic loss to the nation. The small, independent business-
man will be supplanted by clerks. . . . The requirements
contract which is displaced is relatively innocuous as compared
with the virulent growth of monopoly power which the Court en-
courages. . . . It helps remake America in the image of the
cartels. 127
Conclusion
The decision in Chicken Delight will have important effects on
the franchise industry. It is possible that among these effects could
be a shift toward wholly owned outlets for the product. The decision
may also place such impossible burdens on a trademark licensor who
will now be required to utilize continuous on-site inspections in order
to maintain quality control that the public interest in the descriptive
value of trademarks will be harmed.
The interpretation of Fortner by the court in Chicken Delight
125. 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949).
126. Cf. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 520 (2d Cir. 1964).
127. 337 U.S. at 320-21. See Robin, Current Legal Developments in Fran-
chising, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 212, 218 (1970).
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would, if adopted, effectively remove tie-in cases from juries, and
almost entirely remove the element of coercion from consideration in
antitrust cases involving tie-ins. A body of law which has been
developed to prevent the "wielding of monopolistic leverage" and the
"suppression of competition"-tie-in doctrines-would be changed to
an automatic declaration of illegality of any package sale which con-
ceptually can be viewed as consisting of more than one product, regard-
less of the market leverage or the suppression of competition involved.
As to the propriety of applying the law of tie-ins to the instant
facts, as to the court's interpretation of market power in the rule of
per se illegality, and as to the court's view of the proper form of
business operations in the franchise industry, the reasoning in Chicken
Delight deserves reconsideration
Philip R. Bates*
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